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The Policy of sex? … Isn’t sex a private matter? Well, we here discuss where this perhaps or 
indeed seemingly quintessentially private matter intersects with public policy, with a view to 
our developing better informed public policy. 
So, just where might this intersection be located? Well, here are one or two proposals: sex-
work and the public health management and clinical treatment of sexually transmitted 
infection. We will take the latter of these two as our primary focus. There are certainly a 
number of other areas in which one might claim to find sex and policy to be intimately 
  
related, but for now we restrict ourselves to sexual health policy. We treat these topics as 
distinct in the main, because we would suggest that in many ways they are so; but there will 
be important areas of co-concern, as we shall see. 
Put simply, there are two ways one might be inclined to go, when faced with policy decisions 
emerging from the sex-policy intersection, which might have their basis in one’s broader 
political dispositions. One might be inclined to legislate the private and think in terms of 
behavioral prohibitions, controls and constraints (of the legal variety…) or, alternatively, one 
might be inclined to respect the sanctity of the private and think in terms of liberalization 
beyond the current cultural mores (…here one might be open to a proliferation of constraints 
of a different variety). Which way would consideration of our five parameters direct us? 
1. PRECAUTION. The first of our parameters, PRECAUTION, might, given ordinary 
usage, suggest prohibition, control and constraint. If an infection is sexually 
transmitted then prohibiting or restricting sex, or the kinds of sex—e.g. specific acts 
and specific patterns of sexual behavior—might seem like the obvious way to 
exercise precaution. But what if there is a choice here?  
Specific sexual acts carry greater risk of the transmission of infection. Some sexually 
transmitted infections have far greater likelihood of transmission via vaginal 
intercourse than via, say, oral sex, and even greater likelihood via anal intercourse, 
other things being equal. Also, certain patterns of sexual behavior might increase the 
chances of contracting an infection. Patterns of sexual behavior involving multiple 
partners can increase the chances of contracting an infection, over monogamous 
sexual relations, just as monogamous sexual relations bring greater risk than 
abstinence. But such reasoning isn’t alone the source of an inclination to prohibition, 
control and abstinence here. For precaution can be exercised through means other 
than blanket abstinence and/or prohibition. Legislating or seeking to restrict behavior 
is but one option here. We might explore other options, which seek simply to make 
the behavior less risky: condom use, prophylactic use (both pre and post exposure) 
where available and regular sexual health screening are all ways in which we can 
make sex safer without intentionally subjecting sex to constraint.  
The inclination to think in terms of behavioral prohibition, restriction and abstinence 
always draws on more than purely precautionary reasoning. It rather combines 
precautionary reasoning with a particular moral agenda, perhaps latent, that treats 
certain sexual acts and certain patterns of sexual behavior as suspicious, deviant or 
just plain evil. Indeed, there is some evidence deemed through comparative studies of 
societies which pursue prohibition and control, and those that pursue other, non-
prohibitive, precautionary policies, that prohibition and control as policy is not only 
morally-inflected (if not loaded) but ineffective as a precautionary policy. Indeed, 
there are grounds for believing that it is, in fact, not merely ineffective but counter-
productive (See for discussion and detail ‘EVIDENCE’, below). 
A serious problem with policies that seek to prohibit or control is that they serve to 
stigmatise that which is prohibited (and this is a function of the moral aspect of policy 
which seeks to legislate and control behaviour). Stigmatising people, and enshrining 
that stigma in law which prohibits certain acts and certain patterns of behavior (or the 
promotion thereof) on precautionary grounds, inclines most individuals to avoid 
  
anything that might serve to associate them with that which is prohibited and 
stigmatized. Furthermore, another problem with prohibition—a way that it can self-
defeat—is the extent to which in some contexts, such as drug-use and some sexual 
subcultures, representing something as illicit can make that thing more appealing.  
If that which we need to be precautious about is the possibility of sexually transmitted 
infection epidemics, then, crucially, we need to avoid stigmatization and provide 
means of taking precaution which do not smuggle in moral attitudes that militate 
against openness.   
 
2. EVIDENCE. So, what is the evidence that any policy might be based upon? We have 
alluded to it already, in our reference to the comparative studies, which show that 
policies of prohibition, control or abstinence campaigns often lead to increases in STI 
rates.  
But let us get into some detail. Let us here take the example of HIV. The HIV virus 
can be transmitted by a variety of means, via various bodily fluids, including semen, 
vaginal fluids, rectal secretions, blood or breast milk, but not saliva. An individual 
living with the virus, who is on successful antiretroviral therapy, will be likely to have 
a fully suppressed viral load, meaning that the virus is undetectable. Evidence 
continues to emerge which appears to show that an individual with a fully suppressed 
viral load is incredibly unlikely transmit the virus to a sexual partner.  
So, to get the spread of the virus under control we need to ensure that the virus is not 
transmitted via those bodily fluids.  Here are the options: (i) introduce policies and 
laws which at a behavioral level seek to minimize the pathways to infection: these 
have typically taken the form of public health messages which are designed to 
frighten people by emphasizing the danger the virus poses (tombstones etc.), 
emphasizing that sex is risky, particularly with people you’ve just met, and so on.  
Alternatively, (ii) ensure access to antiretroviral therapy for those with the virus, thus 
enabling them to live with a fully suppressed viral load. Further, educate people about 
the transmission pathways of the virus so that they understand how to take 
precautions. For example, one can prevent transmission through establishing a 
physical barrier by use of a condom or one can, in the case of HIV, do it chemically, 
through what we might think of, very loosely, as a ‘bio-chemical condom’: pre-
exposure prophylaxis (tenofovir/emtricitabine PreP), which works by combatting the 
virus, including in the bodily fluids through which it is most commonly transmitted, 
thereby preventing it from gaining a foothold. 
This is where we need the evidence, and we have some. The evidence is that fear 
messages work in the short term, but in the long term produce side-effects which can 
ultimately offset their good short-term effects. Because fear-messaging serves to 
stigmatise those with the virus, or who believe they might have the virus, by implying 
they did something risky and they are now, if they have the virus, dangerous. 
Moreover, such messaging is often targeted at groups considered to be high-risk. 
While this is sometimes welcomed and requested by those groups, it also serves, by 
association, to stigmatise the group through creating a link between the group and the 
  
virus (danger) and the behavior that leads to contracting the virus (risky). (E.g. a link 
is created in the public imagination between being a gay or bisexual man and being 
risky and potentially dangerous.) So, while of course pathways to infection should be 
minimised in the sense of people acting and seeking to act responsibly, wearing 
condoms, etc., nevertheless, in terms of public policy, pathway (ii) is much better 
supported by the evidence than pathway (i). 
If society makes very public claims (such as through public health messaging) that to 
be the bearer of a particular property is to be dangerous and to have been careless then 
that is likely to militate against people coming forward to be tested (they fear that 
merely by coming forward they are in effect saying that they have subjected 
themselves and others to risk and thus will be identified as dangerous: a very 
publically stigmatized group). As one can see from the evidence collected on this in 
Norman Fowler’s recent book: AIDS: Don’t Die of Prejudice, the stronger the fear 
message gets and the more the marginalization of certain groups is in a society, the 
more this mitigates against controlling infection rates. The promotion of fear and the 
association of certain groups with that which is to be feared leads to fewer people 
coming forward for testing, because to do so is to indicate one has failed to heed the 
warnings and engaged in risky behavior; and, further, that one is potentially a member 
of the now stigmatized group. Add to this the fear and shame associated with 
becoming, as the messaging tells you, dangerous.  If that society has also introduced 
legislation such as anti-gay laws then things get even worse.  
This said, it is, therefore, unsurprising that contemporary Russia has increasingly high 
infection rates. Prejudice kills; that’s what the evidence tells us.  
 
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY. How does public policy around sexual health affect the 
politics of a society; who or what does it empower or disempower, politically or 
democratically (or otherwise)? Who or what does it empower or disempower, 
economically? The answer to these questions is not obvious. But we would make a 
couple of preliminary suggestions here: 
 (i) One needs to guard against sexual disease and death becoming an excuse for large 
corporations to make obscene profits. The drugs needed to facilitate antiretroviral 
therapy for those with HIV need to made affordable / brought within the purview of 
the public health system. This is a particularly pressing worry right now, given that 
sexual health in the UK is being funded by local authorities as part of the public 
health budget, and that the government are due to make £200 million worth of public 
health cuts this year. Decisions about where these cuts are being made is down to 
each local authority. Given that local councils have no responsibility for long-term 
care emerging from sexually-transmitted infections, they have unfortunately no 
financial incentive to invest even in provenly effective preventative public sexual 
health, and so, facing harsh financial stringencies, they will very likely divert funds 
elsewhere. (This is of course, incidentally, another argument in favour of having a 
truly national NHS – as we set out in a previous installment of the 5 Parameters.) 
  
 (ii) One needs to be wary of any public policy intervention that will create hostility to 
those who may already be struggling in society. This was already indicated in (2) 
above. And it takes us directly to (4): 
 
4. ASYMMETRY. How does sexual health impact upon those whose voices don’t or 
can’t get heard? This parameter is in the present case fairly closely-aligned with the 
3rd parameter, above. For here we might consider two forms of asymmetry:  
 
First the asymmetry that comes from having policy formed which is inflected by a 
certain moral view. Here the voiceless may be those who do not subscribe to that 
particular view on sexual morality, or those who are depicted as immoral from the 
perspective of the dominant moral viewpoint. For example, the current debate about 
HIV PreP, is strongly inflected, indeed created, one might argue, from there being in-
play certain moral attitudes towards sex, where those arguing against PreP do so 
because, they believe, it will encourage people to have more sex. One might just as 
readily, from within a different moral framework, view enabling people to have more 
sex as a good thing.  
Second, and relatedly, asymmetry emerges from groups being stigmatized. It is a 
function of stigmatization, that the stigmatized group’s voice becomes (further) 
marginal(ised), thereby creating asymmetry.  
In summary: a clumsy public health policy on sex risks being a silencing policy. And 
of course, as we have said, silence risks being death, hereabouts. 
 
5. FRAMING. While one should remain open to the thought that all considerations are 
morally inflected, the specific nature of the moral inflection is what serves to frame 
the discussion. If the discussion is framed by a heteronormative monogamous 
Christian or secularised-Christian attitude to sex then that will steer the emerging 
policy proposals in a certain way. Such policy proposals will, for example, not be 
designed with a view to better enabling or facilitating the living of a polyamorous 
lifestyle, but will be likely to see such a lifestyle as part of the problem and curtailing 
that same lifestyle as, therefore, an important part of the solution. The policy 
proposals will not, for example, be likely to empower sex workers, but rather see the 
answer in further criminalization of sex work … 
However, here is where things may get trickier. For the very frame of ‘sex-work’ 
might itself be questioned. Is ‘sex-work’ work just like any other work? Just like 
office-work, or what-have-you? A possible lurking danger hereabouts is that the 
liberalisation of sexual mores and the overcoming of prejudice around sex, so vital 
(we have suggested) for public health, could turn into commodification and this is 
something we might consider too high a price to pay, as it were. That is: if, in the 
name of overcoming prejudice (not least against ‘sex-workers’) we allow that sex-
work should indeed be construed as simply work, and then (presumably) legalise it, 
are we aiding and abetting the treatment of something intimate and private as 
something else? As with the stigmatizing side-effect of fear messaging discussed 
  
above, we need always to be wary of the unanticipated consequences of well-
intentioned policy.  
The challenge this yields, we believe, is this: can an attitude of non-moralising 
openness around sex, which we have suggested is crucial in relation to public health, 
be sustained while avoiding the production of the side-effect of the commodification 
of sex and bodies (and, if it can, then how)? To answer that question would require a 
further article, perhaps another walk through the five parameters. We’ll simply note 
here that there are various efforts in play to tread this path: most famously the ‘Nordic 
model’, which attempts to strike a bold, feminist-inspired compromise, in essence 
criminalising the commodified buying of sex but not its selling by the provider. Thus 
the ‘sex-worker’ is not stigmatised or punished. In sum: framing considerations 
complexify somewhat the line we have been taking in the current piece. For the 
values and frames that the outcome of parameters 1-4 appears to favour may be 
problematic. We believe that it is wrong to facilitate the complete commodification of 
sex, and to turn the private into something fully public. This is not moralism. It is 
ethics, it is one strand in feminism, and it is a political philosophy of how public 
policy doesn’t necessarily mean the elimination of the private sphere. Should one 
believe that there needs to be protection of the private sphere from state (political) 
interference then one needs to ask themselves whether that same sphere needs 
protection from market obliteration. 
 
Conclusion. 
The considerations adduced under (5), above, complicate things somewhat. But it will 
nevertheless be clear to the reader where the general thrust of our argument is heading. 
Thinking through the five parameters makes pretty clear that, on balance a public policy vis-
a-vis sexual health that seeks only to prohibit, moralise and scare is not an intelligent public 
policy, certainly in the 21st century context. Let’s in summary run swiftly through the five 
parameters again, to see why: 
What is the weight of the five parameters, when it comes to the question of sexual health and 
public policy? On this question, unlike some others that we have looked at earlier in the 
series, precautionary considerations, while sometimes clearly salient, are nevertheless not as 
decisive as they are in some other cases. For, while sexual health is of course quite literally a 
life-or-death matter, it is surely most unlikely to destroy a whole society. If epidemics such as 
HIV are left largely untreated, that can have enormous negative societal consequences: such 
as approximately 300,000 excess deaths in South Africa, as a result of Mbeki’s HIV-
denialism. But unprecautious action in this connection, unlike in relation to (say) nuclear 
weapons, is not at all likely to be ruinous: human extinction is simply not on the agenda, in 
this connection. For, sexual ill-health of its very nature (i.e. due to its transmission route) not 
able to move fast enough to be an utterly ruinous pandemic.  
Similarly, considerations of political economy and asymmetry, which we have suggested in 
previous articles are weighty indeed in cases such as nuclear power (when it is 
authoritarianism and large corporations that will tend to benefit from a pro-nuclear policy, 
and given that it is distant future generations who will have to clean up our mess) are less 
  
weighty in the present case. For, while we suggested above that asymmetry- and political-
economy- considerations probably point toward the conclusion we are tending to urge in the 
current piece — that public policy around sexual health should be heavily oriented 
toward making it possible to treat sexual health as a public policy concern, openly and 
without prejudice —, they are again not decisive. For public sexual health is not primarily 
about aiding the truly voiceless (those at asymmetric risk from decisions made by those in 
charge), and whatever we decide about it is not going to turn our polity into an out-and-out 
totalitarian regime or something similarly undesirable (i.e. it will not be determinative, so far 
as ‘political economy’ is concerned, nor so far as our overall assessment is concerned). 
By contrast, evidentiary considerations, which are less decisive in cases we have previously 
considered — such as nuclear weapons, and geo-engineering — are pretty decisive here. By 
now, we have fairly clear evidence of which sexual health policies work and which don’t.  
And, as we put it just above, a key to the overwhelming importance of this is the following 
key ‘self-reflexive’ point: it turns out to be crucial that one is able to have serious sexual 
public health policy, in order to prevent or adequately treat (for example) the kind of 
widespread misery and suffering that the HIV epidemic brings. And thus a basically ‘liberal’ 
rather than a basically ‘prohibitive’ policy is indicated. 
The framing fly in the ointment suggests that, as ever, any issue worth devoting thousands of 
words to is never simple, never uni-dimensional. What we see in the present case is three 
parameters which tend to point in the direction that is decisively indicated by a further 
parameter that, in the present case, is, we believe, the weightiest of all: evidence. Given this, 
the fifth parameter’s complexifying effect might seem unwelcome. But hey, we never said 
things were going to simple. This is public philosophy. It’s not rocket-science: in many ways, 
it’s much harder than that… 
